4th Circuit upholds ‘three strikes’ for man serving life sentence

Listen to this article

A man serving a life sentence under the federal “three strikes” law failed to have his Michigan bank robbery conviction overturned, with the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that theft was still considered a serious violent crime.

In a 2-1 opinion with Judge Allison Jones Rushing writing for the majority of the panel, the 4th Circuit held that Antonio Lamont Lightfoot’s conviction for a Michigan bank robbery qualified as a serious violent crime under the federal three-strikes clause because Michigan courts have consistently interpreted mugging bank robbery to require the use of force or intimidation against another person.

“The possibility that Michigan would punish under this statute theft committed without force or fear remains purely hypothetical,” the majority wrote.

Under the three-strikes law, a defendant receives a mandatory sentence of life in prison if he or she is convicted in federal court of a serious violent crime and has been convicted at least twice previously in federal or state courts , at least one of which is a serious violent crime. . A serious violent crime includes certain crimes that include the use of force as an element involving a significant risk of the use of force.

In 2000, a jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland convicted Lightfoot of bank robbery and use of a firearm during a crime of violence. According to the opinion, Lightfoot had two prior convictions for serious violent crimes: a 1985 conviction for armed robbery in Virginia and a 1990 conviction for armed bank robbery in Michigan. Because the Maryland robbery was Lightfoot’s third strike, the district court sentenced him to mandatory life imprisonment.

After the United States Supreme Court in 2015 found the “residual clause” of the definition of “violent crime” in the Armed Career Criminal Act to be unconstitutionally vague, Lightfoot argued that the residual clause of the definition of “violent crime” in the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague. serious violent crime” was also void for vagueness. . Lightfoot went on to argue that his Michigan bank robbery is not a serious violent crime because it does not meet any of the remaining clauses of the definition of “serious violent crime.”

The majority held that the essence of robbery involves taking by force or violence or by intimidation or fear, meaning the act qualifies as a serious violent crime.

Meanwhile, in her dissent, Justice DeAndrea Gist Benjamin argued that an aggressive bank robbery can be committed without recourse or threat of physical violence, thus not classifying Lightfoot’s Michigan robbery as a serious violent crime.

“(An aggressive bank robbery) can be committed simply by scaring someone, or, as Lightfoot notes, by locking another up,” Benjamin wrote.

Benjamin gave the example of a hotel guest who is on their balcony and a staff member enters the room to perform maintenance, but the staff member closes the balcony door and locks it , thereby stealing the customer’s valuables. Even if the staff member’s conduct did not involve the use, attempted or threatened use of physical force, the staff member would still be guilty of assaultive bank robbery, Benjamin wrote.

A spokesperson for the U.S. attorney’s office in Maryland declined to comment Thursday. Lightfoot’s attorney did not immediately respond to The Daily Record’s requests for comment.

Lightfoot filed a motion for rehearing by the full 4th Circuit.